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MAVERICK OR TRENDSETTER?-
FIFTH CIRcurr ADDRESSES SLIPPERY QUESTIONS IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
William Trey Jones, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Like all practice areas that focus almost exclusively on the application and
interpretation of federal statutes, employment discrimination law presents the
lawyer with two recurring questions: (1) What has the United States Supreme
Court said about the issue? and (2) What has my federal circuit court said about
the issue? As the Supreme Court continues to clarify the contours of the major
discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), each federal cir-
cuit is called upon to decipher the often ambiguous language in the Court's major
opinions. In addition, the appellate courts must frequently formulate their own
standards for those issues yet to be addressed by the Court.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently tackled controversial issues in
the employment discrimination arena. In the process, the court has filled some
of the cracks inevitably left by a lack of authoritative discussion by the high
Court. Nevertheless, it seems for every question answered, a new one emerges.
This article discusses the recent developments in Fifth Circuit employment dis-
crimination law, including a number of critical issues yet to be resolved by the
court. Part II examines the question of whether an "ultimate employment deci-
sion" is required in non-retaliation disparate treatment cases and analyzes the
court's most recent pronouncements on the issue. Part III discusses the apparent
disagreement on the court with respect to the application of the affirmative
defense in hostile environment sexual harassment cases. Part IV analyzes the
Supreme Court's rejection of the Fifth Circuit's "judicial estoppel" rule in ADA
cases. Finally, Part V discusses the court's recent holding that the evidentiary
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green1 applies to retalia-
tion cases under the FMLA.
II. COURT WRESTLES WITH THE ISSUE OF WHETHER AN
"ULTIMATE EMPLOYMENT DECISION" Is REQUIRED
IN NON-RETALIATION DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits covered employers from dis-
criminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
* Mr. Jones is an associate with the law firm of Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, PLLC, Jackson,
Mississippi, and is a member of the firm's labor and employment law section. Mr. Jones was law clerk to Chief
Judge Tom S. Lee, United States District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, and he maintains an active
employment litigation and worker's compensation practice.
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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national origin2 and from retaliating against employees who oppose discrimina-
tion or who participate in certain activities in connection with discrimination
claims.3 In order to prevail in either a disparate treatment or a retaliation claim,
the Fifth Circuit requires a Title VII plaintiff to demonstrate that she suffered an
"adverse employment action" at the hands of her employer.' While it appears to
be settled that "adverse employment action" in the context of a retaliation claim
means "ultimate employment decision," ' it is not at all clear whether the same
stringent standard should be applied in non-retaliation cases where the plaintiff is
alleging only disparate treatment. While the district courts within the circuit have
apparently interpreted the rather inconsistent Fifth Circuit language as answering
this question in the affirmative, one panel of the Fifth Circuit recently hinted that
the lower courts (and a prior Fifth Circuit opinion) have gotten it wrong and that
the issue will soon be confronted head-on.6
The Fifth Circuit introduced the phrase "ultimate employment decision" in
Dollis v. Rubin,7 a case involving both a disparate treatment claim and numerous
retaliation claims. In so doing, the court imposed a considerably stricter standard
than some other circuits with respect to the "adverse employment action" ele-
ment.8 Affirming the dismissal of the retaliation claims because of the plaintiff's
failure to satisfy the "adverse employment action" element, the court uttered the
now familiar language, "Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment
decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might
have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions." 9 Significantly, in
unveiling the "ultimate employment decision" terminology, Dollis cited Page v.
Bolger,'" a Fourth Circuit opinion which held that a required element of all Title
VII claims, expressly including disparate treatment claims, is discrimination in
an "ultimate employment decision such as hiring, granting leave, discharging,
promoting, and compensating."" Consistent with Page, Dollis went on to affirm
the dismissal of the disparate treatment claim, holding that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that she had been subjected to an "ultimate employment decision"
based on her race or sex.'2
The Fifth Circuit returned to the "ultimate employment decision" standard in
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak,13 a case involving retaliation but no disparate treatment
2. Though all claims under Title ViI technically involve unequal treatment of employees, claims arising
from unequal treatment based on these protected categories will be referred to in this Section as disparate treat-
ment claims, as distinguished from retaliation claims.
3. 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)(2)-(3).
4. See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997) (disparate treatment); Barrow v. New
Orleans Soc. Sec. Ass'n, 10 E3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1994) (retaliation).
5. See, e.g., Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 E3d 702, 707 (5th Cit. 1997).
6. See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 1999).
7. See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 E3d 777 (5th Cir. 1995).
8. See Burger v. Central Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Our court has ana-
lyzed the 'adverse employment action' element in a stricter sense than some other circuits").
9. Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82 (citing Page v. Bolger, 645 F2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981)).
10. Page, 645 E2d at 227.
1I. Dollis, 77 F3d at 781-82 (citing Page, 645 E2d at 233).
12. Dollis, 77 E3d at 782.
13. Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 E3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
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claims. Judge Barksdale, writing for the court, quoted the Dollis language refer-
enced above and stated that Dollis was the culmination of Fifth Circuit precedent
establishing that "Title VII's anti-retaliation provision refers to ultimate employ-
ment decisions, and not to an 'interlocutory or mediate' decision which can lead
to an ultimate [employment] decision.""
Mattern explained that the "ultimate employment decision" requirement is
grounded in the language of Title VII-specifically, the term "discriminate,"
which is found in the anti-retaliation provision. 5 Judge Barksdale's discussion of
the distinction between the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII and the statute's
general proscription against disparate treatment based on protected categories is
worthy of full quotation:
[T]he anti-retaliation provision states that employers shall not "discriminate"
against employees for taking action protected by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 200 0e-3.
In defining this term, we look, of course, to other Title VII sections for guid-
ance; in this case, the preceding section is helpful. That section states, in part,
that it is unlawful to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges or employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). This
type of employer action contrasts sharply with the more vague proscription,
found in the next subpart, of "limitation" of employees which deprive or "would
tend to deprive" the employee of "opportunities" or "adversely affect his status."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l),(2). It goes without saying that this second subpart
reaches much farther than the first. It reaches acts which merely "would tend"
to affect the employee; obviously, the way in which the employee may be affect-
ed in this subpart is much broader. Id. The anti-retaliation provision speaks
only of "discrimination"; [sic] there is no mention of the vague harms contem-
plated in § 2000e-2(a)(2). Therefore, this provision can only be read to exclude
such vague harms, and to include only ultimate employment decisions."6
Mattern s interpretation of Title VII's separate discrimination provisions and its
explication of the ultimate employment decision requirement seemingly raised a
number of questions. Were ultimate employment decisions only required in
retaliation cases, so that a plaintiff alleging ordinary disparate treatment needed
only demonstrate "vague harms" that "merely would tend" to affect her? Had
Mattern overruled Dollis' application of the ultimate employment decision
requirement to disparate treatment claims? Was Judge Barksdale's discussion of
vague harms tend[ing] to affect the employee dicta since Mattern, a pure retalia-
tion case, did not require an interpretation of the requirements for a disparate
treatment case?
The answers to these questions, at least for a while, appeared clear. Dollis was
read to mean exactly what it said-that "Title VII [not the anti-retaliation provi-
sion of Title VII, but all of Title VII] was designed to address ultimate employ-
14. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 709.
16. Id. at 708-09.
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ment decisions ... ."" Acknowledging no limitation by Mattern on the Dollis
holding, district courts across the Fifth Circuit have held that all Title VII plain-
tiffs, whether alleging retaliation claims or solely disparate treatment claims,
must establish that they were subjected to a discriminatory ultimate employment
decision."8 The Fifth Circuit itself, though not expressly doing so, has appeared
on occasion to embrace the broader application of the ultimate employment deci-
sion requirement that Mattern seemed to reject."
Over the past few months, however, a number of Fifth Circuit panels have
inched closer to addressing the question of whether the Dollis holding is sound
in light of Mattern's interpretation of Title VII's prohibitions. In Burger v.
Central Apartment Management," a retaliation case addressing the ultimate
employment decision element, the court, for the first time, reiterated Judge
Barksdale's statutory interpretation in Mattern and emphasized that ultimate
employment decisions are required in retaliation cases because "a retaliation
claim cannot be based solely on a defendant's act of 'limit[ing]' an employee 'in
any way which would deprive [that employee] of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee."' 2 The very next day the
court issued its opinion in Watts v. Kroger,2 a retaliation case in which the court
held that the plaintiff had not satisfied the ultimate employment decision require-
ment. Significantly, the court cited Mattern in a footnote for the proposition
that, "for the purposes of Title VII retaliation claims," adverse employment
actions are defined as ultimate employment actions."
The clearest indication yet that the Fifth Circuit has recognized and may soon
address the apparent inconsistency between Dollis and Mattern is found in
Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche,24 a case involving both disparate treatment and
retaliation claims in which the ultimate employment decision requirement was
discussed at length. In Shackelford, the plaintiff alleged that her employer
refused to train her on the basis of race." The district court held that denying
training to an employee is not an adverse employment action covered by Title VII
and granted summary judgment to the employer.2 6 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
noted that the plaintiff's argument based on the Mattern ultimate employment
17. Dollis, 77 E3d at 781.
18. See Padilla v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 67 F Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Jeffery v. Dallas County
Med. Exam'r, 37 F. Supp. 2d 525 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Dobbs v. Southern Diversified, No. 1:97CV-D-D, 1998 WL
94844 (N.D. Miss. February 2, 1998); Hill v. East Mississippi State Hosp., No. 4:97CV74LN (S.D. Miss.
January 8, 1999).
19. See Ross v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 139 F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 1998) (Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621); Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 E3d 1053, 1060 n.10 (5th Cir.
1998) (stating in dicta that the conduct complained of in the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim did not consti-
tute ultimate employment decisions).
20. Burger v. Central Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 E3d 875 (5th Cir. 1999).
21. Id. at 878 (citing the disparate treatment proscription, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)).
22. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 E3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999).
23. Id. at n.5.
24. Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 1999).
25. Id. at 403.
26. Id. at 406.
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decision standard was inapplicable to her pure race discrimination claim and
should be applied only to retaliation cases." The court side-stepped the issue,
however, and concluded that even if adverse employment actions in the pure dis-
parate treatment context are those actions which merely "'tend to' adversely
affect the employee," the plaintiff's case failed that test as well.28 According to
the court, there was no reasonable basis on which to conclude that the conduct
which the plaintiff complained of "would tend to result in a change of employ-
ment status, benefits or responsibilities.""
The Shackelford panel refused to answer the question of whether an ultimate
employment decision is required in a disparate treatment case."0 On the other
hand, the court did not expressly reject the plaintiff's position that an ultimate
employment decision is not required. Add to this holding the recent Fifth Circuit
opinions discussed above, and it is likely that the Fifth Circuit may soon be
forced to clarify the definition of adverse employment action as it relates to non-
retaliation/disparate treatment claims under Title VII. At issue will be whether
the Dollis ultimate employment decision standard should continue to apply to
disparate treatment claims or whether plaintiffs need only demonstrate adverse
employment actions which "would 'tend to' result in a change of employment
status, benefits or responsibilities," the language offered for the first time in
Shackeford 1 In the meantime, however, Dollis remains the clearest statement
of the law on this point, and its holding, as well as those of numerous district
courts within the circuit, provide ample authority for the proposition that plain-
tiffs alleging pure disparate treatment claims must establish that they were
unlawfully subjected to ultimate employment decisions at the hands of their
employers.
27. Id. at 406-07. It is curious and worth noting that in discussing the plaintiff's position, the Shacketford
court inexplicably appeared to agree with the plaintiff's characterization of Dollis v. Rubin as "a retaliation
case," though, as discussed above, Dollis clearly involved separate claims of retaliation and disparate treat-
ment. This confusion could be based, at least in part, on the fact that headnote 9 preceding the body of the
Dollis opinion erroneously describes the court's last holding as relating to the plaintiff's retaliation claim when
in fact, the court's last holding concerned a disparate treatment claim. See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F3d 777, 778
(5th Cir. 1995). In any event, Shackelfords characterization of Dollis as a pure retaliation case may foreshadow
an interpretation that Dollis' disparate treatment analysis was somehow dicta, which would, of course, allow
that case to fit neatly within the rationale of Mattern and eliminate the necessity of expressly rejecting the
Dollis reasoning.
28. Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 406-07 (citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir.
1997)).
29. Shackelford, 190 F3d at 407.
30. Id. at 406-07.
31. Id. at 407. This new verbiage introduced in Shackeford mirrors the Supreme Court's recently crafted
definition of "tangible employment action," which is now utilized in the sexual harassment context. See
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). In fact, in his concurring opinion in Indest v.
Freeman, Judge Wiener, in dicta, indicated his apparent view that the Supreme Court's terms are the functional
equivalent of the Fifth Circuit's "adverse employment action" element. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.,
168 E3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., specially concurring) (stating that "absent 'any adverse employ-
ment action,' i.e., any tangible employment action, an employer is never vicariously liable for a supervisor's
conduct unless such conduct is either severe or pervasive ... ").
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Ili. "PROMPT REMEDIAL ACTION DEFENSE" SUGGESTED
As A MEANS To AVOID LIABILITY To HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT SExuAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Speaking at the Federalist Society's National Lawyers Convention in
Washington, D.C., on November 13, 1998, Fifth Circuit Judge Edith Jones
remarked
Here are the issues that were not decided [in the Supreme Court's most recent
sexual harassment cases, Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton]. First of all, I don't regard these cases as definitive for what I
would call incipient sexual harassment. Let us say that the boss does three
offensive things spread over six months and finally the employee complains
through the disciplinary proceedings and remedial action is taken. Does that
mean that the employee still has a cause of action? Well, I think there are two
possibilities. One is that there may not have been a sexually hostile environ-
ment in the first place. The other is that there may be some room in which to
say that a prompt remedial action defense exists. 2
Just over two months after delivering this address, Judge Jones authored Indest v.
Freeman Decorating and officially injected the "prompt remedial action
defense" into Fifth Circuit sexual harassment jurisprudence.' The opinion was
immediately labeled the Fifth Circuit's "maverick new decision limit[ing] the
imposition of vicarious liability on employers . . . ."I" Actually, Judge Jones's
Indest opinion did not enjoy a quorum of the panel and, therefore, is not binding
authority."5 Nevertheless, her discussion of employer liability for sexual harass-
ment, coupled with Judge Wiener's special concurrence, illustrates a disagree-
ment on the court regarding the application of the Supreme Court's sexual
harassment affirmative defense.
Indest involved a female service representative who was subjected to crude
sexual comments and gestures by a company executive while attending a six-day
business convention. 36 After the convention, the plaintiff immediately com-
plained to her supervisor, and her complaint was forwarded to the human
resources director and to the company president.37 The company conducted a
thorough investigation that culminated in a reprimand and suspension of the
harassing supervisor.' The company president personally informed the plaintiff
of the company's action and assured her that the harasser would be prohibited
from attending the convention in the future.39 Nonetheless, the plaintiff filed a
32. Sex and the Supreme Court: Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Litigation, FED. SOc'Y LABOR
& EMPLOYMENT LAW NEws, Spring 1999, at 6.
33. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
34. A Maverick Decision from the Fifth Circuit, INSIDE EMPLOYEE RIGHTs LITIGAnON, Mar. 1999, at 3.
35. See Indest, 168 F3d at 806 n. I (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
36. Indest, 164 F3d at 260.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 260-61.
39. Id. at 261.
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discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
a subsequent complaint in federal court alleging sexual harassment.' The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer based on its
prompt remedial action to the plaintiff's complaints, and the plaintiff appealed to
the Fifth Circuit."
Before addressing the employer liability issue, Judge Jones first discussed at
length the Supreme Court's recent clarification of what constitutes actionable
hostile environment sexual harassment in the first instance. 2 She noted that
"Title VII is not a general civility code"" and emphasized that to satisfy the
"demanding standard" that sexual harassment be "severe or pervasive," a plaintiff
must demonstrate more than "[i]ncidental, occasional or merely playful sexual
utterances" and "intersexual flirtation."" Applying this standard to the Indest
facts, Judge Jones opined that, "whether [the plaintiff] was subjected to a sexual-
ly hostile working environment... is a question that we do not need to address,
because... [the plaintiff] cannot establish a basis for [employer's liability]."45
Under Ellerth' and Faragher,7 Judge Jones continued, an employer may raise
an affirmative defense to its liability for hostile environment sexual harassment
created by a supervisor by proving that (1) "it exercised reasonable care to pre-
vent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) "the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." '
According to Judge Jones, however, the EllerthiFaragher test does not apply to
cases where the plaintiff quickly resorts to the grievance procedure, and the
employer takes "prompt remedial action."' 9 Judge Jones opined that "a case pre-
senting only an incipient hostile environment corrected by prompt remedial
action should be distinct from a case in which a company was never called upon
to react to [the alleged harassment]."5 0 To hold otherwise, Judge Jones reasoned,
would amount to strict liability of employers in all cases where the facts do not
present a plaintiff who fails to take advantage of the complaint procedure, even
though the employer moved promptly to investigate and "nipped [the] hostile
environment in the bud.""1 Judge Jones concluded that the Indest facts were dis-
tinguishable from, and therefore not governed by, Ellerth and Faragher, that the
employer did not have to satisfy the second prong of the affirmative defense, and





42. Id. at 262-64.
43. Id. at 263 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
44. Indest, 164 F3dat 263-64.
45. ld. at 264.
46. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
47. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
48. Indest, 164 F3d at 265 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742).
49. Indest, 164 E3d at 265.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 266.
52. Id. at 267.
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Just over a month after the release of Judge Jones's lead opinion in Indest,
Judge Wiener issued a separate opinion concurring in the result on the ground
that the plaintiff could not establish an actionable hostile environment, but stri-
dently disagreeing with the proposition that an employer could absolve itself
from liability for hostile environment sexual harassment simply by taking prompt
action following the complaint. 3 Judge Wiener found no basis in any of the
Supreme Court's sexual harassment jurisprudence for the notion that an employer
is immune from liability for "severe or pervasive" harassment that is at the same
time of an "incipient" nature.5 ' According to Judge Wiener, if the plaintiff estab-
lishes that a supervisor has engaged in sexual harassment creating an actionable
hostile environment, the plain language of Ellerth and Faragher require the
employer to prove both elements of the affirmative defense to escape vicarious
liability, notwithstanding the facts of the particular case.5
A careful reading of the fndest opinions reveals that Judges Jones and Wiener
may disagree more over the form than over the substance of employer liability
for sexual harassment. For example, Judge Wiener noted that "as a practical
matter, inappropriate sexual conduct will virtually never rise to the level of
actionability when an employer takes the kind of prompt remedial action that
Judge Jones applauds (as do we all)."5 6 Earlier in his opinion, Judge Wiener
emphasized that to avoid liability, an employer must prove both elements of the
affirmative defense, "unless, of course, [the plaintiff] cannot prove that the con-
duct [complained of] was 'sufficiently severe or pervasive' to constitute 'action-
able' sexual harassment of the hostile work environment kind."5 In other words,
according to Judge Wiener, if there is a factual basis for what Judge Jones would
term a "prompt remedial action/incipient harassment" defense, it is likely that the
plaintiff will be unable to make out a prima facie case of hostile environment
sexual harassment in the first instance. As such, the employer will not be liable,
and the affirmative defense will never come into play.
Where Judge Jones's and Wiener's distinct methodology may become signifi-
cant is in those cases where there is "severe" (but not ongoing/pervasive) sexual
harassment, followed by an immediate complaint by the plaintiff and a prompt
remedial response by the employer. Employing Judge Wiener's analysis, if the
conduct was indeed severe and thus actionable sexual harassment, the employer
will essentially be strictly liable, since the second prong of the affirmative
defense will be unavailable. On the other hand, Judge Jones's reasoning would
take the case out of the EllerthiFaragher class of cases and would seemingly
allow the employer to escape liability based on its prompt remedial action.
As more and more employers recognize the importance of well-publicized anti-
harassment policies, and as employees become more comfortable taking advan-
53. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999).
54. Id. at 798.
55. Id. at 796.
56. Id. at 803.
57. Id. at 796 (citations omitted).
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tage of complaint procedures, sexual harassment cases will more frequently
involve the factual scenario that created the divergent opinions in Indest. Thus,
defense lawyers will increasingly have the opportunity to raise the prompt reme-
dial action argument. It will remain to be seen whether Judge Jones's or Judge
Wiener's opinion will ultimately win the day.
IV SUPREME COURT REJECTS FIFTH CIRCUIT
APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IN ADA CASES
Disapproving of the position taken by several other circuits that had addressed
the issue, the Fifth Circuit, in Cleveland v. Policy Management,8 held that the
application for or receipt of social security disability benefits creates a rebuttable
presumption that the claimant or recipient is judicially estopped from asserting
that he is a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. The court
reasoned that the two claims incorporate two directly conflicting, "logically
inconsistent" propositions, namely that the claimant is "totally disabled" and
unable to work as required to obtain the social security benefits, but that he is
able to perform the essential functions of the job as required for an ADA claim.59
In the wake of the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Cleveland, district courts within the
circuit applied the estoppel presumption and almost invariably granted summary
judgment to the employer in cases where an ADA plaintiff had applied for or
received social security benefits.60 Meanwhile, the plaintiff in Cleveland had
appealed the court's ruling and, acknowledging the disagreement among the cir-
cuits on the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.61 On May 24, 1999, the
Court issued its opinion vacating the Fifth Circuit's ruling and remanding the
case for further consideration.
62
At the outset, the Court examined the precise language of the statutes at issue
and the requirements for obtaining relief under each."3 The Court noted that to
receive social security benefits, a claimant must take the position that he is
unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity... ." -6, On the other hand,
to state a claim under the ADA, he must argue that he is "a qualified individual
with a disability" who can perform "the essential functions" of his job, at least
with "reasonable accommodation. '65  The Court concluded that "despite the
appearance of conflict that arises from the language of the two statutes, the two
claims do not inherently conflict to the point where courts should apply a special
negative presumption... .",6
58. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 E3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997).
59. Id. at 516-19.
60. See e.g., Graf v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 680, 682 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Pena v. Houston
Lighting & Power Co., 978 E Supp. 694, 699 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Jayroe v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 4:98CV49LN
(S.D. Miss. Apr. 23, 1999).
61. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
62. Id. at 807.
63. Id. at 801-804.
64. Id. at 801 (quoting the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(I)(a)).
65. Id. at 801 (quoting the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12111(8)).
66. Id. at 802.
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According to the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit's presumption of estoppel
was unwarranted "because there are too many situations in which a [social secu-
rity] claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side."6 For exam-
ple, since the Social Security Administration does not take into account the pos-
sibility of "reasonable accommodation," "an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff
can perform her job with reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent
with a [Social Security] DI claim that the plaintiff could not perform the job
without it."'68 Further, an individual might qualify for social security benefits
"and yet, due to special individual circumstances, remain capable of
'perform[ing] the essential functions' of her job."69 Finally, the individual's con-
dition might have changed over time, "so that a statement about that disability at
the time of an individual's application for [social security] benefits may not
reflect an individual's capacities at the time of the relevant employment
decision.""0
In sum, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's special negative presumption of
estoppel and essentially held that each case should be judged on its own facts as
to the impact that the filing of a social security claim has on an ADA lawsuit. In
so holding, however, the Court warned that "in some cases an earlier [social
security] claim may turn out genuinely to conflict with an ADA claim" and that
the plaintiffs in these cases "cannot simply ignore the apparent contradiction that
arises" between the social security claim and the ADA claim.71 Rather, the plain-
tiff must "proffer a sufficient explanation" for the contradiction.72 What is or is
not a sufficient explanation is a question with which the district courts no doubt
will soon begin to grapple.
V COURT HOLDS THAT MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
APPLIES TO FMLA RETALIATION CLAIMS
The FMLA73 is one of the newest federal statutes in the realm of employment
law; therefore, the Fifth Circuit continues to clarify the standards to be applied in
the various claims arising under the statute. In Chaffin v. John H. Carter,"' the
court held that when direct evidence is lacking, the McDonnell Douglas" evi-
dentiary framework will be applied to claims that an employer retaliated against
an employee who exercised rights guaranteed by the FMLA.76
In Chaffin, the court first explained the FMLA's separate entitlement and pro-
scriptive elements." First, the Act requires covered employers to provide eligible
employees up to twelve weeks per year of unpaid leave for certain purposes. 8
67. Id. at 802-03.
68. Id. at 803.
69. Id. at 804.
70. Id. at 805.
71. Id. at 805-06.
72. Id. at 806.
73. 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654.
74. Chaffin v. John H. Carter, 179 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999).
75. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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After a qualifying absence, the employer must restore the employee "to the same
position or a position comparable to that held by the employee before the leave." '79
In addition, an employer may not "'interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise
of... any right provided under' the FMLA."80  Thus, employers have "a pre-
scriptive obligation ... [to] grant employees substantive rights guaranteed by the
FMLA" and "a proscriptive obligation-they may not penalize employees for
exercising these rights."81
Next, the court turned to the question of what organizational framework should
be applied when an employee alleges that she was penalized for exercising rights
under the FMLA 2 Concluding that the familiar McDonnell Douglas approach
should apply, the court reasoned that "there is no significant difference between
such claims under the FMLA and similar claims under other anti-discrimination
laws."I 3 The court went on to opine:
When the often thorny question of intent is involved, deciphering the employ-
ment relationship becomes essential and, in this endeavor, McDonnell Douglas
has proved an enduring guide for courts addressing claims under various
statutes, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act [footnote omitted]. Nothing in the FMLA
landscape suggests that the teachings of McDonnell Douglas would be less use-
ful in ferreting out illicit motivations in that setting [footnote omitted]."'"
As the Chaffin court correctly noted, "[t]he McDonnell Douglas framework is
by now familiar even to those not experts in employment discrimination law."8"
A plaintiff alleging retaliation under the FMLA must establish a prima facie case
by demonstrating that (1) she engaged in a protected activity under the FMLA
(i.e., requested and was granted a leave of absence); (2) the employer subjected
her to an adverse employment action amounting to an ultimate employment deci-
sion; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the
employment decision.8" Once the plaintiff makes this preliminary showing, the
employer must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment
decision. 7 If the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff then must prove that
the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision and
that the real reason was the plaintiff's participation in the protected activity.88
The good news for employment lawyers after Chaffin is that there is already a
well established body of case law applying the McDonnell Douglas framework,
which can now be applied by analogy to what looks to be the newest type of dis-





83. Id. (citing King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1999)).
84. Chafin, 179 F.3d at 31.
85. See id.
86. See id; Boriski v. City of College Station, 65 F Supp. 2d 493, 501-02 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
87. Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319.
88. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps more than any other area of federal court litigation, employment dis-
crimination law continues to confront the practitioner with new and difficult
questions when representing either the employee or management client. The
most recent Fifth Circuit employment discrimination cases, rather than establish-
ing any clearly defined "rules of the road," portend spirited argument on several
key issues. As this area of the law continues to evolve, and as the critical ques-
tions are resolved, the Fifth Circuit will no doubt play a major role in the devel-
opment of employment jurisprudence.
